



The EU's role in policing the rule of law: reflections on recent Polish experience


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Changes to Prosecutor General: "2 become 1"



Minister of Justice



Prosecutor General




Minister of Justice *and* Prosecutor General

Managerial and disciplinary powers

Can create special investigation teams

Can prevent Constitutional Tribunal from continuing with hearing



Capture of national media



Head of Polish National TV (TVP)

Jacek Kurski (former PiS Minister)














Reaction of Prosecutor General

MoJ Zbigniew Ziobro



General Supervisor of investigations into potential offences regarding the CT judgment

CT President Rzeplinski



Investigated for having exceeded the scope of his statutory powers (by refusing to allow all 5 "December judges" to sit as CT judges)

PM Beata Szydlo



Over 100 private notifications of a potential crime – nonfulfilment of statutory duties (not publishing CT judgment).

Criminal Code, Art. 231(1): Any public officer who fails to fulfil (or exceeds the scope of) their statutory obligations, commits an offence.



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Constitutional Tribunal – new President

Julia Przyłębska



One of the "December judges".

Appointed to organise the election of the new CT President [NB. This was previously done by the CT Vice-President]

Organised ballots on the election of CT President, with procedural irregularities:


e.g. ballots held without requisite quorum

e.g. combining 2 separate ballots into one vote

She was elected CT President.

The legality of her nomination was challenged.

1 day before challenge was heard, CT declared the relevant provisions unconstitutional



Constitutional Tribunal in chains


J.Kaczynski: "CT was a political organ which would have blocked our plans"

Constitutional review in Poland has become a fiction.



While the cat's away, the mice will play

PiS prepares and implements a wide range of legislation which raise rule-of-law concerns




Other legislation adopted by Sejm



Reform of Common Courts

- MoJ can "retire" and "replace" any common court
 President or V-P. No consultations/explanations required.
- Court Presidents can "move" judges to different departments w/out their consent
- Court Presidents can influence composition of judicial panels
- MoJ decides whether a retirement-age judge may continue in office
- NB. The EU Commission noted the existence of discrimination in the statutory retirement ages of women (60) and men (65)



Other legislation adopted by Sejm



Supreme Court

- All judges to be "retired" (unless chosen to "stay" by MoJ.
 No criteria exist for the MoJ decision)
- MoJ nominates Heads of Divisions (e.g. Civil, Criminal etc.)
- MoJ creates internal regulations (number of judges, competences, *discipline* etc.)
- SC will no longer be able to provide "abstract" legal opinions on legislation –
 opinions will only be binding in the current case (i.e. no precedent whatsoever)
- Other SC members will be chosen by National Council of the Judiciary (controlled by politicians)




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Other legislation adopted by Sejm



National Council of the Judiciary:

- Very important role in judicial appointments and disciplinary matters (President cannot accept a judge who was not nominated by Council).
- Intended to "guard the independence of the courts and judges" (Constitution: Art 186[1])
- 15 members of 21 members are chosen by judges (Constitution: Art 187[1]).
- Period of office is 4 years (Constitution (Art 187[3])
- Reforms to remedy Poland's "judicial elite" and establish "democratic control"
- All members to be "retired"
- New members will be chosen by Sejm
- 2-tier structure (1. political; 2. judicial) political tier essentially chooses judges



Shock Presidential intervention...



- 1. Reform of Supreme Court
- 2. Reform of National College of Judiciary
- 3. Reform of Common Courts

Signed (entered into force 12/8/2017)

"Presidential version" of statutes 1-2 will be published on Monday 25/9/17

Ctrl+F (Find) "Minister of Justice" and Ctrl+V (Replace) "President" ???



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Meanwhile...


Sędziowie SO wrazili dezaprobatę wobec decyzji Zbigniewa Ziobry ws. odwołania wiceprezesów sądu



MoJ dismisses 3 Vice-Presidents of Poland's largest regional court (and the largest in the EU)







The Commission's Rule of Law Framework



If Art 7 was intended to be preceded by Commission dialogue (inc. opinions and recommendations), why doesn't it say that?

Does the Commission's role as "guardian of the Treaties" role justify the creation of the Framework? (Note how *Art 258* and *Articles 121-126* are very differently worded)


Would we accept the legitimacy of other/multiple "Frameworks" created by the other potential initiators of Article 7:

(i) EP;

(ii) one third of the Member States (Frameworks x 3?)

Transparency concerns

"there has been a **clear request from the public at large** for the EU, and notably for the Commission, to take action.."



The Commission's Rule of Law Framework




Does the **New Framework** procedure *work*?

Can you really have a "constructive dialogue" with a government working towards constitutional capture?

If the Commission initiates the Framework, does this not simply delay Art 7 being initiated by the Commission (or EP or 1/3 of Member States)?

Uncertainty whether Council will support the Commission if Art 7 is launched.



Art 7 as the solution?




Art 7(1): Is Poland likely to follow Council recommendations?

Do any real consequences flow from a Council decision that Poland demonstrates a "clear risk of a serious breach of [Art 2]"?

Art 7(2): Would the required unanimity be achieved?


Would the credibility of the EU be damaged if the Commission initiated Art 7 but it proved ineffective?

Is the "core meaning" of the RoL (identified by the Commission) sufficiently clear to ensure consistent application of **Art 7?** Is the "devil in the detail" problematic?



UK as a threat to the rule of law?

- Unelected head of state. Courts have no jurisdiction over Monarch
- Judges cannot declare Parliamentary legislation unconstitutional or inapplicable.
 Parliament can prevent judges asking if legislation complies with ECHR.
- Minsters can adopt secondary legislation which changes primary legislation
- No "right to a court"
- No automatic "right of appeal"
- · Over 90% of criminal cases are decided in the absence of a qualified judge
- Until recently...
- All judges are (in practice) appointed by the government.
- · The most senior judge is also a government Minister and controls debates in Parliament.



Conclusions

- The EU's current response to rule of law crises is ineffective.
- Alternatives responses for the future include:
- (i) Unilateral nuclear disarmament (resign from Art 7 and/or the New Framework); or
- (ii) Nuclear proliferation (expand on EU's existing nuclear arsenal);
- (iii) Reliance upon existing conventional weapons (Art 258/259);
- (iv) **Developing** *new* **conventional weapons** (via legislative/judicial intervention).
- (v) Supporting national NGO's and civic society movements



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The only successes so far...



December 2016
"Free media protest" prevents
restrictions on media access to Sejm



March 2017
"Black Protest" prevents complete
prohibition of abortion



July 2017"Free Courts protest" supports independence of Supreme Ct

"The established elites, trying to protect their privileges"







